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on firm characteristics. Finally, our main results remain consistent after performing 
several robustness tests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is of great concern as it disrupts economic growth and development 
in general. It has undeniable negative effects, such as loss of human life and 
property destruction. Besides these effects, terrorist attacks adversely affect 
economic outlook and financial markets through reduced consumer and investor 
confidence (see Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006; Frey et al., 2007). A prime example 
is the attack in Bali in 2002, which killed 202 people. This attack disrupted the 
Indonesian economy. The stock market, for example, plunged 10.4%, the rupiah fell 
significantly against the dollar and many industries suffered losses, both directly 
and indirectly, due to the loss of consumer and investor confidence (Bradsher and 
Banerjee, 2002).
Due to the prevalence of terrorism in recent years, a growing literature has been 
devoted to studying the effect of terrorism on the economic and financial systems. 
These studies focus on: macroeconomic variables (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Blomberg et al., 2004; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; 
Llussa and Tavares, 2011; Narayan et al., 2018); stock prices (Eldor and Melnick, 
2004; Karolyi and Martell, 2005) and stock market returns (Carter and Simkins, 
2004; Drakos, 2004; Ito and Lee, 2005; Arin et al., 2008; Chesney et al., 2011; Goel et 
al., 2017); and stock market sentiment (Burch et al., 2003; Glaser and Webber, 2005; 
Nikkinen, and Vahamaa, 2010). 
Regarding the literature on the effect of uncertainty on investment, there 
are studies that identify types (namely, input and output price uncertainty) of 
uncertainty that can potentially impact investment (see Pindyck, 1991; Bloom et 
al., 2007). Other studies also point out macroeconomic uncertainty (Bloom, 2009), 
policy uncertainty (Gulen and Ion, 2015; Setiastuti, 2017), political uncertainty 
(Julio and Yook, 2011, 2012; An et al., 2016) and oil price uncertainty (Uri, 1980; 
Bernanke, 1983; Mohn and Misund, 2009; Elder and Serletis, 2010a, 2010b; 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 2011, Wang et al., 2017; Phan et al., 2019) as important to 
determining investment.1
In Indonesia, terrorism is also a matter of great concern. According to the 
2019 Global Terrorism Index, Indonesia ranks 35th among countries with a high 
index score. In terms of the deaths from terrorism during 2017-2019, Indonesia 
ranks 5th. Among the Asia-Pacific countries that have been consistently affected by 
terrorism, Indonesia is the only one with an index score that deteriorated in 2018. 
Looking at Figure 1, which plots the number of terrorist attacks in the country 
from 1999 to 2017, we observe a worrying trend. Although the number of attacks 
dropped significantly from over 100 cases in 2001 to only 2 in 2007, the number of 
terrorist incidents started to increase again, which averaged 20 cases per year from 
2007 to 2019.
1 Some recent papers investigate the uncertainty by COVID-19 on financial markets, such as Al-
Awadhi et al. (2020), Ali et al. (2020), Devpura (2020), Fang & Zhang (2021), Fu & Shen (2020), Gil-
Alana & Monge (2020), Haroon & Rizvi (2020), Hoang & Syed (2021), Liu et al. (2020), Narayan 
(2020a, b, c), Qin et al. (2020), Phan & Narayan (2020), Narayan et al. (2021), Sha & Sharma (2020), 
Sharma & Sha (2020), Sharma (2020), Zhang et al. (2020), Wang & Su (2021). See also recent survey 
paper by 
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This paper aims to empirically examine the relationship between terrorist 
attacks and investment decision at the corporate level in Indonesia. In particular, 
we aim to answer the following question: Does terrorism negatively influence 
Indonesian firm operations, especially investment activities? The answer to 
this question is of particular importance as terrorism can affect firms in various 
industries both directly and indirectly. 
The underlying rationale of this hypothesis is simple. Because terrorist attacks 
are unforeseen catastrophic events, terrorism is believed to have a strong adverse 
impact on market sentiment and significantly increase uncertainty (Nikkinen 
and Vahamaa, 2010). The effect of uncertainties caused by terrorism on corporate 
investment can be explained by two strands of the literature. First, the real option 
theory suggests that faced with surging uncertainty, firms may choose to postpone 
their investment and wait for new information (see Bernanke, 1983; McDonald 
and Siegel, 1986; and Pindyck, 1988, 1991). Moreover, terrorism can also affect 
corporate investment via the demand channel as it lowers consumer and investor 
confidence. As a result, there may be a shock to firms’ demand which induces firms 
to become more cautious and reduce their irreversible investment (Bloom et al., 
2007). The second strand of the literature is motivated by financial frictions theory. 
The risk of default, as well as the equity risk premium, are arguably increased by 
uncertainty (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990; Gilchrist et al., 2011. This, in turn, 
increases the cost of external financing and hence reduces firm investment level.
We test the relationship between terrorism and corporate investment using a 
data set which includes around 5000 firm-year observations from 1997 until 2017. 
Our study contributes to the terrorism and corporate investment literature in the 
following ways.
Figure 1.
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First, whilst a lot of attention has been given to the effect of terrorism on 
investment at the aggregate level, such as national private investment (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Blomberg et al., 2004; Nitsch and 
Schumacher, 2004; Llussa and Tavares, 2011), foreign direct investment (Enders and 
Sandler, 1996) or at the industry level, such as farming (Singh, 2013) and tourism 
(Choyakh, 2008), our understanding of the effect of terrorism on investment at the 
firm level is limited. One notable exception is Oh and Oetzel (2011). Oh and Oetzel 
(2011) employ a data set of 71 multinational corporations in Europe from 2001 to 
2006 with 31,285 observations to study the effect of major disasters on subsidiary 
investment levels of these corporations. They discover that terrorist attacks have 
a negative impact on the number of foreign subsidiaries of these multinational 
firms. This study aside, none consider the effect of terrorism on a firm’s capital 
expenditure. Therefore, we contribute to the literature by presenting the first 
evidence on this relationship at the firm level.
Second, we provide a broader picture of the impact of terrorism on corporate 
investment by examining this relationship across different industries, namely basic 
materials (BM), consumer discretion (CD), consumer staples (CS), energy (EN), 
financials (FI), health care (HC), industrials (IN), real estate (RE), technology (TE), 
and telecommunications (TEL). Moreover, we also examine whether the effect of 
terrorism on corporate investment is subject to firm characteristics. To do this, 
we divide our sample into different panels, including low market capitalization 
(MV0), high market capitalization (MV1), low book-to-market ratio (BM0), high 
book-to-market ratio (BM1), young firms (FA0), mature firms (FA1), low trading 
volume (TV0), high trading volume (TV1), low volatility (VO0), and high volatility 
(VO1).
Our findings are as follows. First, we document a negative impact of terrorism 
on corporate investment (capital expenditure) in Indonesia. Second, both the sign 
and size of the effect of terrorism on firm investment vary across different sectors 
as well as across different firm characteristics. Finally, our main results hold under 
some robustness tests, including using different model specifications and different 
sub-sample periods.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the 
data set used for our analysis and the empirical model. Section III presents the 
main findings and robustness tests. Finally, the paper is concluded in section IV.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
Table 1 provides specific details of the variables used in this study. All firm-specific 
data were downloaded from Datastream, while Indonesia’s GDP growth rate and 
the number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia were collected from the World Bank 
and Global Terrorism database, respectively. Our sample has annual data that 
start from 1999 and end in 2017.
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To gain more insights on the hypothesis test, we group our sample into 
various panels based on their sectors and firm characteristics. First, we have an 
aggregate panel that includes all firms in our sample. For sectoral analysis, the 
dataset is portioned into 10 sectors and 10 panels formed on firm characteristics, 
as explained above.
B. Methodology
Our main regression follows a typical investment type model specification:
Table 1.
Variables Description
This table reports the description and data source of variables
Variable Description Database
INV Capital expenditure scaled by total assets in a previous year Datastream
TERRORISM Natural log of the number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia Global Terrorism Database
Q Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets Datastream
CF
Earnings before interest and taxes minus taxes and interest 
expense plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by total 
assets
Datastream
GDP Indonesia GDP growth rate World Bank
GROWTH Change in sales scaled by sales of the previous year. Datastream
LEVERAGE Total debt scaled by total assets. Datastream
where i and t are index firm and time, respectively. This regression model follows 
previous studies, such as Blundell et al. (1992), Blundell et al. (1999), Agung (2000), 
Hidayat (2010), Julio and Yook (2012), Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) and Phan et 
al. (2019). Our dependent variable, INV, is defined as the firm’s capital expenditure 
as a percentage of total assets in the previous year. The main independent variable, 
TERRORISM, is measured by the natural log of the number of terrorist attacks 
in Indonesia. Q is the Tobin’s q, which is measured by the asset market value to 
book value, in ratio form. Cashflow, CF, is earnings before interest and taxes, 
minus interest and tax expenses, plus depreciation and amortization. Following 
the previous literature (see Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015; Phan et 
al., 2019), we control for general economic conditions by using the growth rate 
of GDP. As conventional practices, a panel data model with fixed firm and year 
effects are used, and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Preliminary Results
Table 2 reports some selected descriptive statistics, including the number of 
observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile and 75th percentile 
(1)
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values. Consider the third column of Table 2, where we report the mean values. 
The Indonesian firms, on average, spend an amount valued about 5.589% of prior 
year’s total assets on their capital expenditure. During the period from 1999 to 
2017, the yearly average number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia is 23.67. The mean 
values of Q and CF are 2.008 and 10.098, respectively. In term of GDP, Indonesia 
experienced an average growth rate of 5.043% per year during the sample 
period. GROWTH and LEVERAGE are the two variables that are used later in our 
robustness tests. While the former is measured by the sales growth rate, which is 
the change in sales scaled by sales in the previous year, the latter is firm leverage 
ratio measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. In the 1999-2017 period, 
Indonesian firms had a high sales growth rate, which averaged 12.06% per annum. 
Finally, the average leverage ratio of Indonesian firms during this period is 0.284. 
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
This table reports selected descriptive statistics for the variables.
Variable Observation Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th 75th
INV (%) 5774 5.589 2.376 8.631 0.539 6.760
TERRORISM 7942 3.164 3.091 0.864 2.773 3.689
Q 5620 2.008 1.120 3.291 0.590 2.218
CF (%) 5751 10.098 9.256 12.620 3.630 15.713
GDP (%) 7942 5.043 5.033 1.209 4.780 6.014
GROWTH (%) 5765 12.060 11.230 38.003 -1.296 24.042
LEVERAGE 6072 0.284 0.215 0.298 0.047 0.426
Next, we turn to Table 3, which reports results of the unconditional correlations 
among variables in our main regression model. Note that the correlation coefficients 
are quite low, except the one between GDP and TERRORISM, which is -0.584. 
However, it is still acceptable, and we can safely infer that our model is free from 
the multicollinearity problem. 
Table 3.
Unconditional Correlation
This table reports the unconditional correlations and their p-values (in parentheses) among variables in our regression 
model.





CF 0.218*** -0.064*** 0.245***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.118*** -0.584*** 0.033*** 0.009
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.481)
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B. Regression Results
B1. Aggregate Panel
We report the results of the determinants of corporate investment in Table 4. The 
second column of Table 4 presents value coefficients and standard errors of our 
main regression, while the third column presents results without TERRORISM. 
The results can be summarized as follows. First, the coefficient of the terrorist 
attack variable is negative (-0.597), which means that if the number of attacks 
increases by 1% then firms will reduce their capital expenditure – total assets ratio 
by 0.597 basis points. This result supports our hypothesis that terrorism, measured 
by the number of attacks, has a negative impact on corporate investment. In other 
words, firms tend to invest less in response to an increase in the number of terrorist 
attacks in Indonesia. This result is also statistically significant. 
Furthermore, we examine the effects of other determinants, such as Q, CF and 
growth rate of GDP. As per our expectations, the results from both regressions (1) 
and (2) show that the coefficients of these variables are statistically significant and 
have consistent signs across the two models. Finally, the adjusted R-squared in 
both regressions takes a value of 33.3%.
Table 4.
Regression Results
This table reports the results of determinants of corporate investments with and without terrorist attack variable in 
Model (1) and (2), respectively. The regression models take the following forms:
 (1)
 (2)














Firm effect Controlled Controlled
Year effect Controlled Controlled
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.333
To examine the economic significance of terrorism on corporate investment, we 
calculate the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the number of terrorist 
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attacks. On average, when the number of attacks in a year increase by one standard 
deviation, i.e. 0.864, firms reduce their capital expenditure by nearly 9.23%.2
B2. Sectoral Analysis
This section investigates the effect of terrorist attack on investment of firms in 
different sectors. Given that corporate investment projects are partially irreversible, 
the effect of uncertainty is expected to be stronger for firms with a higher level of 
irreversible investments (see Gulen and Ion, 2015). In addition, the cost of delaying 
investment is expected to be different across firms and industries. Specifically, 
firms in more competitive industries experience lower expected costs of waiting 
due to the larger advantage of being the first-mover. Therefore, it is of interest 
to investigate the heterogeneity in the investment-terrorism relationship across 
different sectors.3 
The regression results for each of the 10 sectors are presented in Table 5. Results 
are as follows. First, the effect of terrorism on corporate investment is statistically 
significant in six sectors (60%), including basic materials, consumer staples, 
healthcare, industrials, technology and telecommunications. Second, regarding 
the sign of the effect, while terrorism has a negative impact on basic materials, 
consumer staples, industrials and technology, it positively influences investments 
of firms in healthcare and telecommunications. Third, the magnitude of the effect 
are different across sectors. The absolute values of the terrorism coefficient are in 
the 2.122 to 10.150 range. Out of six panels that are statistically significant, capital 
expenditure of firms in the consumer staples sector is affected least by terrorism 
and telecommunications sector reacts most strongly to terrorism.
Similar to the previous subsection, we also calculate the economic significance 
of terrorism on firm investment. For those firms that react negatively to terrorism, 
we find that when the number of attacks decreases by one standard deviation, 
firms in basic materials increase their capital expenditure by 113.27% and firms in 
consumer staples, industrials and technology raise their investments by 32.80%, 
41.96% and 68.73%, respectively. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in 
the number of terrorist attacks leads to 101.74% and 156.91% increases in capital 
investment of firms in healthcare and telecommunications sectors, respectively.
Finally, the effects of other determinants, i.e. Q, CF and GDP, are statistically 
significant in many panels, and the adjusted R-squared varies in the 0.174 to 0.487 
range.
2 The economic significance is calculated by taking one standard deviation of TERRORISM multiply 
by the value of its coefficient in Model (2) of Table 4 and divide by it mean value.
3 Note that due to low number of observations, utility sector is dropped.
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B3. Firm Characteristics Analysis
This section aims to investigate whether firms with different characteristics react 
differently to terrorism. Table 6 reports the effect of terrorist attacks on corporate 
investment for panels sorted on firm characteristics. There are some interesting 
observations that stand out. First, the coefficient of TERRORISM is statistically 
significant in eight (80%) out of 10 panels; the exception are the MV0 and VO1 
panels. Like the sectoral analysis, we see heterogeneity in both sign and size of the 
effect of terrorism on corporate investment across panels. Regarding the sign of 
terrorism effect on investment, the results show that the capital expenditure of firms 
with MV1, BM0, FA0, TV1, TV0 and VO0 are affected negatively by an increase in 
the number of terrorist attacks. In contrast, BM1 and FA1 firms respond positively, 
i.e. raise capital expenses, to an increase in the number of attacks. Furthermore, 
among firms which are affected negatively, terrorism has the weakest impact on 
capital expenditure of TV1 firms: the coefficient is -0.283, and the strongest impact 
is on FA1 firms (-2.123). For those firms that react positively to terrorist shocks, the 
strongest impact is on FA1 firms which is followed by BM1 firms. The values of 
the TERRORISM coefficient of these two panels are 1.283 and 0.842, respectively.
Turning to the economic significance results, we find that BM1 and FA1 firms 
raise their capital expenditure by 13.02% and 19.83%, respectively, in response to 
a one standard deviation increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Across MV1, 
BM0, FA0, TV1, TV0, and VO0 firm panels, firms reduce their capital investment 
by between 5.91% to 32.82% when the number of attacks increases by one standard 
deviation. The biggest cut in capital expenditure is found for FA0 firms, while the 
modest cut belongs to TV1 firms.
Finally, consistent with our expectations, the effect of other determinants, 
namely, Q, CF and GDP, is statistically significant in most of the panels. Moreover, 
the value of adjusted R-squared varies from 23.4% to 41.7%.
C. Robustness Tests
We apply a number of robustness tests. In particular, we use different model 
specifications as well as different sub-sample to see whether our main results hold.
C1. Different Regression Model Specifications
We test the consistency of our main findings by adding two control variables, 
namely the growth rate of sales, GROWTH, and the leverage ratio, LEVERAGE, 
into our main regression. This approach is also used by An et al. (2016) and Wang 
et al. (2017).
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Table 7.
Different regression model specifications
This table reports the results of the robustness test using different model specifications. We include additional control 
variables that have been used in previous literature to our baseline regression model. The coefficients are their 
t-statistics are reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
TERRORISM -0.391*** -0.917*** -0.724***
(-4.706) (-11.391) (-8.924)
Q 0.282*** 0.256** 0.277***
(2.941) (2.764) (2.936)
CF 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.024***
(3.159) (4.356) (2.987)






Constant 5.091*** 9.962*** 8.102***
(10.825) (23.718) (18.164)
Observations 4,744 4,843 4,733
Firm effect Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year effect Controlled Controlled Controlled
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.342 0.349
The regression results are reported in Table 7. Our main findings are consistent. 
Regardless of the model specifications, terrorism has a negative effect on the 
level of corporate capital expenditure. Moreover, the coefficient of TERORISM is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all three models. 
C2. Different Sub-samples
In general, financial crises led to a shock to the supply of credit, hence firm 
investment is affected during these periods (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). Existing 
literature has shown that corporate investment is significantly affected during 
the financial crisis (see Rousseau and Kim, 2008; Campello et al., 2011; Kahle and 
Stulz, 2013; Phan et al., 2019). Thus, in this section, we further our robustness test 
by employing different sub-samples. In particular, we use three different sub-
samples: 1999-2007 period; 2008-2017 period; and 1999-2017 period excluding the 
Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009).
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Table 8.
Different Sub-samples
This table reports the results of the robustness test using different sub-samples. We divide our sample into two sub-
sample periods 1999-2007 and 2008-2017. We also have another sub-sample that the Global Financial Crisis period 
2007-2009 is excluded. The coefficients are their t-statistics are reported. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
1999-2007 2008-2017 Remove 2007-2009
TERRORISM -0.245** -1.575*** -0.635***
(-3.278) (-17.464) (-6.631)
Q 0.225 0.250* 0.287**
(1.538) (2.123) (2.781)
CF 0.021 0.021 0.033***
(1.443) (1.606) (4.374)
GDP 0.103 1.653*** -0.461***
(1.315) (10.265) (-10.896)
4.848*** -0.178 7.007***
Constant (6.783) (-0.186) (14.024)
-0.245** -1.575*** -0.635***
Observations 1,591 3,263 4,079
Firm effect Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year effect Controlled Controlled Controlled
Adjusted R2 0.430 0.352 0.350
The results of this robustness test are reported in Table 8. Similar to previous 
findings, the effect of terrorist attacks on the level of corporate investment remains 
statistically significant and negative across all three sub-samples. Therefore, we 
can safely conclude that the choice of different sub-samples does not influence the 
effect of terrorism on the level of firm capital expenditure.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper tests the effect of terrorism on corporate investment in Indonesia. The 
empirical analysis is based on an annual frequency data set, which includes around 
5000 observations from 1997 until 2017. Applying the standard investment type 
regression that is used widely in the literature, the paper offers some important 
findings. First, the effect of terrorist attacks on corporate investment in the 
aggregate panel is negative. On average, with a one standard deviation increase in 
the number of attacks, firms’ capital expenditure reduces by 9.23%. Second, firms 
in different sectors react differently to terrorist shocks. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks causes the level of corporate investment 
to change from -113.27% to 156.91% across different sectors. Third, similar 
heterogeneity is found when we divide our sample into different panels based on 
firm characteristics. Using firm characteristic sampling, the economic significance 
of a one standard deviation increase in terrorist attacks on firm investment is in 
the -5.91% to 19.83% range. Finally, results from our robustness tests are similar to 
our baseline findings.
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